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ANALYSIS OF EA-18G GROWLER ENGINE 
MAINTENANCE AT NAVAL AIR STATION WHIDBEY 
ISLAND, WA 
ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this research is to conduct a cost-benefit analysis of the repair of EA-18G 
aircraft engines at Naval Air Station (NAS) Whidbey Island, WA.  Currently, Fleet 
Readiness Center West (FRC West) at NAS Lemoore, CA, provides engine repair to all 
squadrons flying F/A-18E/F Super Hornet and EA-18G Growler aircraft.  The F/A-18E/F 
Super Hornets use the F414-GE-400 engine, the same engine/propulsion system/module 
used in the EA-18G Growler.  The introduction of EA-18G Growlers to the Navy and 
replacement of aging F/A-18C aircraft with Super Hornets has increased the demand for 
repair at FRC West.  Over 1,000 miles separates the Growlers at Whidbey Island and the 
repair facility at NAS Lemoore, which affects readiness levels.  This research builds on 
the findings and recommendations of a previous thesis project at the Naval Postgraduate 
School Forecasting the Demand of the F414-GE-400 Engine at NAS Lemoore, which 
concluded that FRC West is working at 100% utilization.  The present project focuses on 
the practices both NAS Whidbey Island and NAS Lemoore use and creates a scenario 
that duplicates the test cell for the Growler engine and relevant equipment at NAS 
Whidbey Island.  The goal of this project is to identify whether the Growler’s readiness 
would be increased by adding limited repair capability and the capability to test the F414-
GE-400 engine at NAS Whidbey Island, as well as any additional benefits that might be 
gained.  
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RBA     Ready Basic Aircraft 
RFI     Ready for Issue 
RFT     Ready for Tasking 
RTAT     Repair Turn Around Time 
TAT     Turn Around Time 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. BACKGROUND 
The EA-6B Prowler electronic suppression aircraft started its operational duties in 
1971.  The Navy and Marine Corps employ the EA-6B Prowler as a shield of protection over 
their strike aircraft, ground troops, and ships by jamming the enemy’s radar, electronic data 
links, and communications.  In 2003, Boeing was awarded a developmental contract for the 
EA-18 Growler to replace the 40-year-old EA-6B Prowler.  However, it was not until 
“November 2010 [that] the first EA-18G Growler squadron started their maiden deployment 
to the Central Command located at Al Asad Air Base, Iraq” (Plecki, 2011, para. 1).  This 
deployment marked the beginning of the phasing out of the EA-6B Prowler.  Both Prowler 
and Growler aircraft are home-based out of Naval Air Station (NAS) Whidbey Island, WA, 
where Prowlers are repaired (see Figure 1); however, the repair facility for the Growler is at 
NAS Lemoore, CA.  As the Growler continues to replace the Prowler, the question arises,  
Should Whidbey Island have limited capability to repair Growler components? 
B. TWO NAVAL AIR STATIONS 
According to NAS Lemoore’s website, its  “principal mission is to support Strike-
Fighter Wing, U.S. Pacific Fleet and its mission to train, man, and equip the west coast 
Strike-Fighter squadrons” (Naval Air Station Lemoore, 2012).  NAS Lemoore is also the 
home of Fleet Readiness Center West (FRC West), which “provides the highest quality 
Intermediate and Depot Level aviation maintenance, component repair, and logistics support 
to the fleet both locally and around the world, in the fastest, safest, most cost efficient 
manner possible” (FRC West, 2012).  In an MBA project titled Forecasting the Demand of 
the F414-GE-400 Engine at NAS Lemoore, Hersey, Rowlett, and Thompson (2008) stated 
that most of the Super Hornet/Growler engines are repaired at FRC West.  They concluded 
that the repair capability of F414-GE-400 engines at FRC West was near 100% capacity, 
given manpower levels at that time.  As the Growler replaces the Prowler and operational 
wear and tear occurs to the Growler, the question arises of how the current repair cycle will 
keep up with the operational demand, both for the F/A-18E/F and EA-18G.    
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Figure 1.  Over 1,000 Miles Between the Two Repair Sites 
According to NAS Whidbey Island’s (NASWI) website,  
[NASWI] is the premier naval aviation installation in the Pacific Northwest 
and home of all Navy tactical electronic attack squadrons flying the EA-6B 
Prowler and EA-18G Growler.  Adding to the depth and capability of the air 
station are four P-3 Orion Maritime Patrol squadrons and two Fleet 
Reconnaissance squadrons flying the EP-3E Aries. (Naval Air Station 
Whidbey Island, 2012) 
Whidbey Island, WA, is also the home of Fleet Readiness Center Northwest (FRC 
Northwest).  According to its website, 
Fleet Readiness Center Northwest, previously known as Aircraft Intermediate 
Maintenance Detachment (AIMD), was established in 1959 and developed 
into the premier Intermediate and Depot Maintenance Facility in the Pacific 
Fleet. Over 1,100 Sailors, Marines, civilians, contractors and depot 
maintenance level personnel at FRC [Northwest] provide aviation 
maintenance and logistics support to 13 EA-6B squadrons, six P-3/EP-3 
squadrons, 12 aircraft carriers, one C-9 squadron, the station Search and 
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Rescue component and various Northwest Region activities. (FRC Northwest, 
2012)  
As the Navy phases out the Prowler, the demand for repairing its engine will also 
decrease.   
C. RESEARCH OBJECTIVE 
In this project, we focus on the feasibility of adding limited repair capability for the 
Growler engine at FRC Northwest.  We also examine practices followed at both FRC West 
and FRC Northwest and simulate a scenario in which Whidbey Island has limited repair 
capability for the Growler engine.  By analyzing this scenario, we hope to identify whether 
the readiness of the Growler would be increased, as well as any additional benefits that might 
be gained. 
D. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Our primary question is, Should FRC Northwest gain limited repair capability for the 
F414-GE-400 engine, including updating the existing test cell?  To assist in answering this 
question, we assess the demand for engine repair during calendar year 2012 and the current 
forecasting method used to estimate engine demand. 
E. METHODOLOGY 
Our investigation for this paper encompassed a lengthy literature review and data 
analysis.  The concepts applied are from Logistic Engineering, Operational Management, 
Supply Chain Management, and Simulation Modeling for Management Decision Making 
courses we completed at the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS).  Additionally, we used 
maintenance practices that are outlined in the Naval Aviation Maintenance Program (NAMP; 
Commander, Naval Air Forces [COMNAVAIRFOR], 2012) instruction.  
To create the estimate, we utilized the fleet’s 2012 data pertaining to the Growler 
engine, primarily gathered from PMA-265, Electronic Attack Wing and FRC West.  
Although these data captured only one year of flight operations, we believe they represent the 
Growlers through various deployments.  
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F. REPORT ORGANIZATION 
In Chapter I, we provide a general awareness about the research project and 
background information for the situation, research objective, research question, and 
methodology.  In Chapter II, we provide background information on the NAMP.  In Chapter 
III, we review the various studies, government and acquisition reports, and websites, 
including those published by the original equipment manufacturer (OEM).  In Chapter IV, 
we explore various logistic engineering concepts used to develop our cost-benefit analysis.  
In Chapter V, we discuss the analysis of the spare engine and how protection level can affect 
it.  In Chapter VI, we present our results, conclusions, and recommendations. 
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II. BACKGROUND 
In this chapter, we define the concepts necessary to understand the dynamics of naval 
aviation maintenance.  First, we explain the NAMP instruction (COMNAVAIRFOR, 2012) 
and how it defines different levels of maintenance.  Second, we describe FRCs, including 
how they have evolved, and what their position in the Naval Aviation Enterprise (NAE) is.  
Third, we present an overview of FRC Northwest’s Power Plants Division structure.  Finally, 
we explain the Planned Maintenance System (PMS) and how it relates to engine maintenance. 
A. NAVAL AVIATION MAINTENANCE PROGRAM 
The aviation maintenance community considers the NAMP its bible.  “The NAMP 
applies to all organizations operating or supporting Navy and Marine Corps manned and 
unmanned aircraft and related equipment” (COMNAVAIRFOR, 2012, p. 1).  It also 
standardizes the policies and procedures for the management of all Navy and Marine Corps 
aviation maintenance activities.  The objective of the NAMP instruction is as follows:  
to achieve and continually improve aviation material readiness and safety 
standards established by Chief of Naval Operations /Commander Naval Air 
Forces (COMNAVAIRFOR), with coordination from the Commandant of the 
Marine Corps (CMC), with optimum use of manpower, material, facilities, 
and funds. (COMNAVAIRFOR, 2012, p. 1-4) 
The NAMP separates maintenance into three levels—organizational, intermediate, 
and depot—to maximize readiness of aircraft and equipment and allow the Navy to manage 
personnel and material more efficiently.  Ultimately, this instruction documents the main 
doctrine of naval aviation maintenance and takes precedence over all other aviation 
maintenance documents, unless otherwise directed within it.   
1. Levels of Maintenance 
The three levels of maintenance can be considered as a pyramidal hierarchy because 
the higher levels build upon capabilities and functions provided by the lower levels.  Task 
complexity, space requirements, skill level of assigned personnel, and scope of support 
responsibility are the basis for the separation of tasks.  Although the intermediate and depot 
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levels are more specialized, their main focus is to support their primary customer: the 
organization level. 
a. Organizational-Level Maintenance 
Organizational-level (O-level) maintenance is work performed on aeronautical 
equipment owned by the operational command.  “The O-level maintenance mission is to 
maintain assigned aircraft and aeronautical equipment in a full mission capable status while 
continually improving the local maintenance process” (COMNAVAIRFOR, 2012, p. 3-1).  
This level of maintenance is the closest to the warfighter in terms of ensuring that the aircraft 
are operational and able to fly when scheduled.  Blanchard (1992) described the O-level as 
follows: 
Organizational-level personnel are usually involved with the operation and 
use of equipment, and have minimum time available for detailed system 
maintenance.  Maintenance at this level normally is limited to periodic checks 
of equipment performance, visual inspections, cleaning of equipment, some 
servicing, external adjustments, and the removal and replacement of some 
components.  Personnel assigned to this level generally do not repair the 
removed components, but forward them to the intermediate level.  From the 
maintenance standpoint, the least skilled personnel are assigned to this 
function. (p. 115) 
b. Intermediate-Level Maintenance 
Intermediate-level (I-level) maintenance consists of more specialized 
maintenance in removal, repair, and replacement of assemblies, modules, or piece parts.  
“The I-level maintenance mission is to enhance and sustain the combat readiness and mission 
capability of supported activities by providing quality and timely material support at the 
nearest location with the lowest practical resource expenditure” (COMNAVAIRFOR, 2012, 
p. 3-2).  At the I-level, test equipment assists Sailors or Marines in identifying faulty 
components and the repairs needed to return an item to a ready for issue condition.  
Blanchard (1992) described the I-level as follows: 
At this level, end items may be repaired by the removal and replacement of 
major modules, assemblies, or piece parts.  Scheduled maintenance requiring 
equipment disassembly may also be accomplished.  Available maintenance 
personnel are usually more skilled and better equipped than those at the 
organizational level and are responsible for performing more detail 
maintenance.  Maintenance tasks that cannot be performed by the lower levels 
^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜ=mêçÖê~ã=
dê~Çì~íÉ=pÅÜççä=çÑ=_ìëáåÉëë=C=mìÄäáÅ=mçäáÅó - 7 - 
k~î~ä=mçëíÖê~Çì~íÉ=pÅÜççä=
due to limited personnel skills and test equipment are performed here.  High 
personnel skills, additional test and support equipment, more spares, and 
better facilities often enable equipment repair to the module and piece part 
level. (pp. 115–116) 
c. Depot-Level Maintenance 
Depot-level (D-level) maintenance is the most in-depth maintenance within 
naval aviation and is performed at the FRCs.  “D-level maintenance is also performed on 
material requiring major overhaul or rebuilding of parts, assemblies, subassemblies, and end 
items” (COMNAVAIRFOR, 2012, p. 3-2).  The FRCs assist both the organizational and 
intermediate maintenance levels by providing engineering assistance and performing 
maintenance that is beyond the ability of the lowest level unit.  This repair capability is the 
furthest from the warfighter, but it gives the NAE the ability to get components in nearly new 
condition.  Blanchard (1992) stated, 
The depot level constitutes the highest type of maintenance, and supports the 
accomplishment of tasks above and beyond the capabilities available at the 
intermediate level.  The depot level of maintenance includes the complete 
overhauling, rebuilding, and calibration of equipment as well as the 
performance of highly complex maintenance actions. (p. 116) 
B. FLEET READINESS CENTER 
On February 13, 2006, the NAE’s board of directors accepted the FRC concept, one 
of the most dramatic transformations in the 50 years of naval aviation maintenance.  Naval 
Air Systems Command developed the FRC concept because of the recommendation of the 
2005 Base Realignment and Closure Committee.  This concept integrated the ashore 
Intermediate Maintenance Activity (IMA) and the depot as one repair facility, creating the 
Center of Excellence Repair Facilities, with a mission “to produce quality airframes, engines, 
components, [support equipment] SE, and [to] provide services that meet the NAE’s aircraft 
[ready-for-tasking] RFT goals with improved effectiveness and efficiency” 
(COMNAVAIRFOR, 2012, p. 12-1).  Additionally, the FRCs provide integrated off-flight 
line repair, in-service industrial scheduled inspections/mods, and deployable Sea Operational 
Detachment personnel that augment the afloat Aircraft Intermediate Maintenance 
Detachment/Departments (AIMDs). Figure 2 shows the FRC chain of command. 
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Figure 2.  Fleet Readiness Center Chain of Command 
1. Engine Repairs 
FRCs contain many divisions that repair a variety of aeronautical components.  For 
example, the Power Plants Division is responsible for engine repairs.  As an example, 
Figures 3 and 4 depict an F41-GE-400 engine and the components of that engine.  Their 
levels of repair capability are first-, second-, or third-degree repair.  Repair is defined as 
“necessary preparation, fault correction, disassembly, inspection, replacement of parts, 
adjustment, reassembly, calibration, or tests accomplished in restoring items to serviceable 
status”  (COMNAVAIRFOR, 2012, p. A-65).  The NAMP (COMNAVAIRFOR, 2012) 
defined the degrees of repair as follows: 
FIRST-DEGREE REPAIR - The repair of gas turbine engines to a depth 
which includes and goes beyond that repair authorized for second- and third-
degree IMAs. It includes compressor rotor replacement and disassembly to a 
degree that the compressor rotor is removed. Any degree of repair which 
requires compressor rotor removal constitutes first-degree repair. Only those 
activities specifically designated as first-degree repair activities and included 
in NAVAIR NOTE 4700 will be outfitted to accomplish repair of that 
magnitude. (COMNAVAIRFOR, 2012, p. A-28) 
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Figure 3.  F414-GE-400 Engine 
SECOND-DEGREE REPAIR - The repair of a damaged or non-operating gas 
turbine engine, its accessories, or components to an acceptable operating 
condition. As used in this instruction, repair by designated IMAs includes the 
repair/replacement of turbine rotors and combustion sections, including 
afterburners. Also authorized are replacing externally damaged, deteriorated, 
or time-limited components, gear boxes, or accessories, and conducting 
engine inspections. In addition, minor repair to the compressor section is 
authorized, for example, dressing nicks in compressor vanes and blades within 
limits of the operating and service instructions. Further, the repair or 
replacement of reduction gearboxes and torque shafts of turbo shaft engines 
and compressor fans of turbofan engines which are considered repairable 
within the limits of the approved intermediate maintenance manuals shall be 
done by second-degree repair activities. (COMNAVAIRFOR, 2012, p. A-70) 
 
Figure 4.  Six Sections of the F414-GE-400 Engine 
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THIRD-DEGREE REPAIR - Encompasses the same gas turbine engine repair 
capability as the second-degree repair except that certain functions which 
require high maintenance man-hours and are of low incident rate are excluded. 
(COMNAVAIRFOR, 2012, p. A-78) 
2. Fleet Readiness Center Northwest (Whidbey Island, WA) Power Plants 
Division 
FRC Northwest’s Power Plants Division (see Figure 5 for an illustration of FRC 
Northwest’s chain of command) qualifies as a second-degree repair activity site for the J-52 
and T-56 engines; it can inspect, repair, and test the engines for the Prowler (J-52 engine) and 
the P-3C (T-56 engine).  Power Plants inspect for verification of all applicable technical 
directives, for high-time components, and for a history of discrepancies.  However, Power 
Plants does not have any repair capability for the F414-GE-400 engine, leaving it able only to 
preserve or de-preserve engines for Growler squadrons. 
 
Figure 5.  Fleet Readiness Center Northwest Power Plants Division Chain of Command 
C. PLANNED MAINTENANCE SYSTEM 
The PMS is a program that ensures that aircraft and aeronautical equipment are 
maintained throughout their service life.  Naval Aviation Logistics Command Management 
Information System (NALCOMIS) is the computer database that tracks maintenance actions.  
NALCOMIS can track scheduled inspections that are performed at particular intervals (e.g., 
hourly, calendar, event driven).  The hourly inspections can be performed within a 10% 
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deviation of the standard.  The calendar inspections can be performed with a deviation of 
plus or minus three days.  Event-driven inspections are performed as needed, such as 
following a hard landing.  Because aircraft engines are tracked by operational hours, the 10% 
deviation can be applied to engine inspections.  To illustrate, the Growler’s engine has a 200-
hour inspection that can be accomplished between 180 hours and 220 hours of operation. 
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III. LITERATURE REVIEW 
There have been several studies that have explained and analyzed the F414-GE-400 
engine and its repair cycle.  Some of those studies suggested areas of further research, which 
served as a point of reference and guidance for our methodology in this research.  We 
utilized lessons learned from the Operations Management, Supply Chain Management, 
Business Modeling and Analysis, and Simulation Modeling for Management Decision 
Making courses, which we completed at NPS.  The concepts we learned were of great 
significance in helping us analyze the current repair cycle for the Growler engines and in 
providing useful recommendations for improving aircraft readiness. 
Stearns (1998) presented a simulation metamodel used to determine initial rotatable 
pool inventories for F404-GE-400 engine modules onboard a deployed aircraft carrier.  
Stearns’ study looked at the AIMD afloat, their pool of F404 engines, and their repair cycle.  
He claimed that millions of dollars could be saved annually by following the metamodel 
recommendations for changes and reduction in inventories, while the operational availability 
Ao   of the squadron could also be maximized.  In his study, Stearns (1998) developed the 
simulation model from real maintenance and usage data and provided a detailed and accurate 
representation of the repair cycle.  By using regression analysis, he claimed that the Navy 
could achieve annual savings of over $1.16 million by lowering the inventory quantities of 
F404 engine modules onboard aircraft carriers.  Stearns (1998) also recommended that the 
simulation factors be updated once a year with current data and that the metamodel be re-
computed to determine shifts in significance among the modules.  Moreover, he claimed that 
the squadron’s Aₒ would benefit from adjusting inventory levels to reflect the changes. 
Bartlett and Braun (1993) provided a feasibility study and cost-benefit analysis to 
determine what generic D-level capabilities must be shifted to certain AIMDs to reduce costs 
and improve fleet support of the F404-GE-400/402 turbofan engine.  Their study examined 
the cost analysis of engine maintenance between two maintenance facilities: AIMDs at NAS 
Cecil Field and NAS Lemoore.  Bartlett and Braun (1993) used a simulation of both repair 
facilities to determine whether expanding the repair capacity or keeping the status quo was 
more beneficial.  With the help of their simulation model, they concluded that there are 
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strong indications that expanding the repair capabilities of the AIMDs is feasible and cost 
effective.  Moreover, they claimed that transferring welding and spin balance capability from 
the depot at Jacksonville, FL, to the AIMDs at NAS Cecil Field and NAS Lemoore would 
reduce turn around time (TAT) with only a minimal increase to work-in-process time.  Their 
study also calculated the net savings of manpower costs depending on whether Navy or 
civilian personnel are used to augment spin balance and welding work centers and whether 
new or existing equipment is utilized in these work centers.  The projected maintenance cost 
savings over a 10-year period claimed by Bartlett and Braun (1993) was $4.9 million, 
assuming civilian augmentation and new equipment, whereas with the existing equipment 
and naval personnel, the savings over a 10-year period was $5.9 million.  
Hersey et al. (2008) forecasted the repair demand of the F414-GE-400 engine and 
determined whether FRC West would be able to meet increased demand in the near future.  
Their study collected the current history of I-level repairs for the F414 engine and estimated 
their increase based on the arrival of additional engines procured by the Navy.  The 
researchers built an optimization model to determine whether manning levels were adequate 
to perform the forecasted demand for engine repair.  By applying linear regression, double 
exponential smoothing, and optimization modeling, Hersey et al. (2008) concluded that the 
number of engines FRC West will repair would rise.  In the study, Hersey et al. (2008) also 
mathematically demonstrated that FRC West is working at or near 100% capacity.  
Hersey et al. (2008) concluded that the mean time between failures (MTBF) equals 
the mean time since repair, and MTBF is decreasing on five of the six engine modules.  
Another important recommendation of the Hersey et al. (2008) study is to move the depot 
from FRC Southwest to FRC West, which would reduce shipping costs and in-transit 
inventory.  Hersey et al. (2008) also found that inconsistent demand was creating a potential 
bottleneck in the afterburner repair shop because repairs were being postponed while 
awaiting parts (AWP), which was forcing management to choose between a stoppage of 
work or a cannibalization action.  To overcome the AWP situation, Hersey et al. (2008) 
recommended an annual review of the safety stock within the supermarket along with a 
forecast of the demand and MTBF for each module.  In this study, we replicate the Hersey et 
al. (2008) study, but we use new data and focus on Whidbey Island, resulting in some new 
insights on the topic. 
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Schoch (2003) studied the so-called I3 to D concept, used for F414-GE-400 module 
and engine repair, in which the I-level maintainers do not repair modules.  Instead, they send 
all modules requiring repair to the depot for D-level repairs.  At the time of the study, this 
was a new concept.  In the study, Schoch (2003) developed a simulation model that 
incorporated F/A-18E/F flight schedules and engine failures to populate the repair cycle.  The 
simulation provided Aₒ, probability of engine failures, and number of spare engines required 
given an infrastructure and sparing profile.  Schoch (2003) used three previous years of 
module failures and depot repair times to calibrate the model.  Simulation results for the 
baseline studied showed the distinct influence of certain input parameters, which are listed as 
follows:  
 Aircraft service entry time had a short-term effect on Aₒ. 
 Cannibalization of the engines among F/A-18s improved Aₒ.  
 Scheduled maintenance impacted Aₒ. 
 All the components of depot repair turn around time (RTAT), “In Work,” and 
“Other” influenced Aₒ. 
The simulation was also used to examine the impact of varying build windows and 
depot RTAT.  It allows easy changes of input parameters to be made so that a multitude of 
effects on Aₒ and probability of failure can be readily studied. 
Hagan and Slack (2006) studied how to decrease the F414 engine throughput time at 
the AIMD at NAS Lemoore by employing organizational modeling and evaluating how 
changes to the organizational structure could affect engine throughput time.  To achieve the 
purpose, Hagan and Slack (2006) developed a baseline model of the organization’s existing 
structure and performance and compared this with the duration of required maintenance.  
Various modification/interventions were made, including paralleling the tasks associated 
with accomplishing administrative paperwork when receiving the engine and tasks associated 
with on-engine maintenance, combining personnel positions, decreasing centralization from 
high to low, adding personnel, and modifying the duration and frequency of meetings.  The 
findings of Hagan and Slack’s (2006) study indicated that the paralleling effort significantly 
decreased the maintenance duration, which likewise decreased centralization from high to 
low, decreased meeting frequency, and slightly increased duration, which in turn facilitated a 
decreased duration.  The study calculated that the benefit due to the interventions to reduce 
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the F414 throughput duration was significant, and Hagan and Slack (2006) estimated that 
there was a reduction of over 35% in engine throughput time from the baseline case. 
Hagan, Slack, Zolin, and Dillard (2007) studied the impacts of using the NAVAIR 
Enterprise AIRSpeed program of Lean, Six Sigma, and the Theory of Constraints by AIMD 
at NAS Lemoore.  Particular attention was given to achieving time and cost reductions and 
calculating the improvements of implementing changes in the organizational structure or 
management practices.  Their study considered that portion of the AIMD Power Plants 
Division that accomplishes F414 maintenance.  It considered only tasks associated with 
maintenance efforts, starting from receipt of the engine to the point at which the engine is 
determined ready for issue (RFI).  To achieve their objective, Hagan et al. (2007) employed 
organizational simulation software to test interventions that could reduce throughput time for 
the F414 engine.  They developed a baseline model and modeled and simulated interventions.  
The simulated results indicated that paralleling some tasks could significantly decrease 
maintenance duration while maintaining quality.  Twenty-six days of repair time per engine 
were saved by the implementation of the interventions.  The Hagan et al. (2007) study also 
proved that organizational modeling and simulation could identify time and cost savings over 
and above techniques such as Lean and Six Sigma.  
Jafar, Mejos, and Yang (2006) conducted a study on the J52-P408 engine repair 
process and the implementation of the AIRSpeed program at AIMD at NAS Whidbey Island.  
Although this study was conducted on the J52-P408 engine used by EA-6B Prowler aircraft, 
it provided an overview of the engine repair process at NAS Whidbey Island.  Jafar et al. 
(2006) analyzed the incorporation of the total ownership costs and the following 
methodologies in the engine repair process: just in time, and Lean Six Sigma.  They also 
examined the effects of these methodologies in relation to repair cycle-time and overall 
readiness level.  In their study, they also described and compared the earlier and the current 
AIRSpeed engine removal and repair processes, starting from the flight line to the RFI pool 
at AIMD.  Using simulation modeling tools and private industry production and inventory 
management philosophies, Jafar et al. (2006) examined how the application of AIRSpeed 
processes contributes to the mission readiness of the Navy’s and Marine Corps’ fleets of EA-
6B Prowler aircraft, while reducing operation and maintenance cost. 
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Based on the analysis of the simulation model and embellishment results, Jafar et al. 
(2006) concluded that the AIRSpeed process at the AIMD J52 Engine Repair Shop is 
effective.  The methodologies employed by FRC Northwest’s AIRSpeed team proved to be 
beneficial in expediting the engine repair process once the engine was inducted.  
Consequently, crew utilization rates decreased from 64% down to 33%, increasing efficiency 
and providing more time for quality work, professional training, and family time.  
Hall, Leary, Lapierre, Hess, and Bladen (2001) studied the F/A-18E/F F414 In-flight 
Engine Condition Monitoring System (IECMS).  IECMS combines diagnostic algorithms, 
engine control system computer sensors, and airframe computers to process and report real-
time engine health.  Experts from Boeing, GE Engines, and the Navy conducted this 
interesting study in order to test the cell performance of the F414-GE-400 engine.  Hall et al. 
(2001) described system elements with an emphasis on the manner in which they are 
integrated into IECMS and the benefits of IECMS to the pilot, maintenance crew, and 
weapon system readiness.  In the study, Hall et al. (2001) presented comparisons between the 
baseline and advanced IECMS capabilities. Differences between the baseline and advanced 
IECMS include anomalies detected by IECMS during engine ground runs and in-flight, along 
with the resulting maintenance actions or design changes that improved system safety, 
reliability, and maintainability.  
Hall et al. (2001) concluded that the advanced IECMS system is fully integrated 
between the engine and airframe and effectively uses available avionics computers and 
interfaces, which contributes to low system weight.  This advanced system includes many 
improvements, including the following:  
 better aircrew displays and additional cautions and advisories; 
 additional mission computer resources; 
 reliable, new Full Authority Digital Engine Control with outstanding fault 
detection and isolation capabilities; 
 improved monitoring hardware installation and signal processing; 
 expanded memory unit data recording; 
 the addition of an engine-mounted master electrical chip detector; and 
 additional maintenance codes for improved fault detection and isolation. 
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All of these improvements contributed to reduced pilot workload and aircraft/engine 
maintenance.  Hall et al. (2001) concluded that due to IECMS, aircraft readiness improved 
with fewer engine runs, less required downtime for troubleshooting, and rapid turn around 
through onboard diagnostics.  Hall et al. (2001) also found that during the Navy Engineering 
and Manufacturing Development Technical Evaluation phase when aircraft reliability, 
maintainability, and built-in test performances were measured, the advanced IECMS 
achieved a 100% engine failure detection rate and a 0% false alarm rate.  They also 
concluded that as the F/A-18E/F weapon system continues to grow and mature, IECMS is 
designed with the flexibility to accommodate future engine/airframe enhancements well into 
the 21st century. 
Tallant, Hedrick, and Martin (2008) studied the supply side of engine database errors 
and how the errors pertain to the F404 engine.  In this study, Tallant et al. (2008) assessed 
cost as an independent variable of the maintenance manpower of both the OEM Contractor 
Logistics Support (CLS) and an estimated organic Navy complement of maintainers for the 
P-8 Poseidon program.  Tallant et al. (2008) made comparisons to similar aircraft 
procurements and analyzed them for possible benefits and limitations regarding a single-
source provider of CLS.  Furthermore, they reviewed logistic acquisition culture and 
operational impacts to determine the feasibility of CLS.  Some of the methodology that was 
used in the Tallant et al. (2008) study is relevant to our research.  
Government Accountability Office (GAO) reports are an important source of 
impartial recommendations and information for Department of Defense (DoD) programs.  
The reports pertaining to the Growler aircraft highlight the importance of our current project.  
The high costs associated with procuring, operating, and maintaining DoD aircraft are always 
scrutinized by Congress.  Any organizational or structural changes to minimize these types of 
costs are always welcomed by lawmakers.  
In 2002, the DoD completed an analysis of alternatives for the EA-6B that concluded 
the inventory of EA-6Bs would be insufficient to meet the DoD’s needs beyond 2009 (GAO, 
2006).  Based on this conclusion, the Navy began development of the EA-18G aircraft as a 
replacement for the EA-6B.  The GAO (2006) report Option of Upgrading Additional EA-
6Bs Could Reduce Risk in Development of EA-18G provides background knowledge on the 
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Growler and its predecessor the Prowler.  The report looked at the missions and services the 
Prowler has accomplished and how best to develop the Growler without rushing it out to the 
fleet.  The 2006 GAO report examined the validity of the DoD’s 2002 conclusion that the 
Prowler inventory would be insufficient beyond 2009.  The report concluded that the 
acquisition approach used to develop the Growler is knowledge based and might mitigate 
future risks.  
The GAO (2010) report Tactical Aircraft—DOD’s Ability to Meet Future 
Requirements Is Uncertain, With Key Analyses Needed to Inform Upcoming Investment 
Decisions assessed the DoD’s tactical aircraft requirements, the extent to which plans for 
upgrading and retiring legacy aircraft and acquiring new aircraft are likely to meet the 
requirements, and how changes in strategic plans and threat assessments have affected 
requirements.  This GAO (2010) study was relevant to our project because it provided 
background knowledge and an understanding of the Growler aircraft itself.  The report 
suggested that Congress consider requiring that the costs associated with modernizing and 
sustaining the legacy fleet be included in future investment plans, and recommended that the 
DoD define the number of tactical aircraft required in the future and the size and severity of 
projected shortfalls.  Moreover, the DoD should clearly articulate how systems like 
unmanned aircraft are accounted for and complete a comprehensive cost-benefit analysis of 
options for addressing expected shortfalls.   
The GAO (2012) report Airborne Electronic Attack Achieving Mission Objectives 
Depends on Overcoming Acquisition Challenges studied the DoD’s strategy for acquiring 
airborne electronic attack capabilities, the DoD’s progress in developing and fielding systems 
to meet airborne electronic attack mission requirements, and the DoD’s additional actions to 
address gaps in airborne electronic attack capability.  In order to achieve these objectives, the 
GAO (2012) analyzed documents related to mission requirements, acquisition and budget 
needs, development plans, and performance.  The GAO (2012) report recommended that the 
DoD conduct program reviews for certain new, key systems to assess cost, schedule, and 
performance; determine the extent to which the most pressing capability gaps can be met and 
then take steps to fill them; align service investments in science and technology with the 
department-wide electronic warfare priority; and review capabilities provided by certain 
planned and existing systems to ensure investments do not overlap. 
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In a report published by the Congressional Research Service and authored by 
Bolkcom (2006) titled Navy F/A-18E/F Super Hornet and EA-18G Growler Aircraft: 
Background and Issues for Congress, Bolkcom studied the background of the F/A-18 from 
the legacy aircraft (versions A-D) to the Super Hornets (versions E and F).  Bolkcom (2006) 
also gave the backdrop for the Prowler being replaced by the Growler.  The study provided 
important aspects of the legacy and Super Hornet versions of the F/A-18 as well as the 
Prowler prior to the Growler entering service.  Bolkcom (2006) compared the aircraft with 
their respective predecessors and provided views and arguments from both sides to enable 
Congress to decide on the financial aspects linked with the procurement and research, 
development, test, and evaluation of the aircraft.  The Growler uses an F414-GE-400 engine, 
which is also used by the FA-18E/F Super Hornet.  Bolkcom’s (2006) report explained the 
idea of the Navy using a common engine and airframe to replace the Prowler, which resulted 
in the use of the same assembly line and reduced training, operating, and maintenance costs 
from operating a single common platform.  By assigning I-level maintenance of the F414 
engine to FRC West, located at NAS Lemoore, CA, maintenance costs were further reduced. 
The DoD’s (2011) Selected Acquisition Report: EA-18G described the background 
and current status of the Growler from the Navy’s point of view.  This report provided 
information about the updated status of the Growler program and any potential problems the 
program manager foresaw, as well as past delays that occurred.  It provided information 
about how many Growler aircraft the Navy was expected to procure.  Based on this number, 
we could analyze and recommend whether FRC Northwest should or should not modify its 
engine test cell to test the F414 engine.  The DoD’s (2011) Selected Acquisition Report: EA-
18G also provided the timeline for full-rate production (FRP) and the FRP acquisition 
program baseline (APB) for the Growler.  Total procurement of the Growler was planned for 
114 aircraft.  As of December 31, 2011, the DoD’s (2011) Selected Acquisition Report: EA-
18G stated that the EA-18G program had delivered 56 aircraft to the fleet, and the Growler 
aircraft had flown 33,533 hours. The report also concluded that there are no software-related 
issues with this program. 
The Boeing (2012) article Backgrounder: EA-18G Growler provided an interesting 
overview about the Growler aircraft from Boeing’s perspective.  The basic information about 
the Growler is available through various means, but Boeing’s information is considered to be 
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the official version.  The article presented important information relating to the aircraft, with 
special emphasis on its background, purpose, capabilities, general characteristics, milestones 
achieved, and current status (in terms of number of aircraft delivered to the Navy) as of 
September 2012.  This article helped us forecast the demand of F414 engine repairs because 
the contract through 2015 includes delivery of an additional 58 Growlers. 
The NAVAIR (2012) article “EA-18G Growler” provided us a description of the 
Growler from the user’s point of view.  This Navy website briefly explains the description, 
capabilities, and specifications of the Growler.  In the article, NAVAIR (2012) stated that the 
Growler is similar to the Super Hornet, which enables cost-effective maintenance 
supportability for both aircraft, setting the stage for continuous capability enhancement and a 
long life.  
The GE Aviation (2012) article “Model F414-GE-400” provided us with basic 
information about the F414 engine, which is used by the Super Hornet and Growler aircraft.  
The information provided by GE Aviation is considered to be the most reliable and relevant 
in terms of the engine’s technical and physical traits.  The article provided us background 
knowledge about the evaluation of the engine and its various phases of development.  This 
information was very helpful in understanding the dynamics and operational capabilities of 
the F414 engine.  
An article from GlobalSecurity.org (2011) titled “F414” fully described the F414 
engine and explained its evolution from the F412 (designed for the A-12) to the F414 and its 
use of the F404 engine (designed for the F/A-18).  The article dissected the engine down to 
its different modules, which helped us in understanding the workings and repair process of 
the engine.  The article also compared the F414 and F404 engines in terms of capabilities and 
performance, and this information helped us in assessing the possibility of an F414 engine 
test cell at FRC Northwest.   
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IV. METHODOLOGY AND REFERENCE DATA 
In this chapter, we describe our primary data sources and offer a brief introduction of 
various techniques, methods, and assumptions we used to systematically analyze the data 
regarding the F414-GE-400 engine and answer our research questions.  We also explain the 
reasons we selected the techniques we used during our research. 
A. ANALYSIS TECHNIQUES 
The FRCs have consolidated their major repair processes; hence, they are considered 
the centers of excellence for their respective areas.  In both Logistics Engineering and Supply 
Chain Management courses taken at NPS, we discussed the concept of consolidated centers 
and discovered why they are more economical.  Other courses, such as Operations 
Management, Business Modeling and Analysis, and Simulation Modeling for Management 
Decision Making, which we also completed at NPS, provided us with key techniques for 
analyzing the data.  Using these techniques, we analyzed the data with the help of both 
academic theories and on-the-job practices to visualize the organizational flow and on-
ground, real-world scenarios that exist within the repair cycle. 
1. Cost-and-Benefit Analysis 
The concept of cost-and-benefit analysis is a method to assess the relative worth of a 
plan by using an evaluation of options.  Mishan and Quah (2007) explained that cost-and-
benefit analysis is a way of selecting the best solution, as well as a way of evaluating 
previous choices.  We used this concept broadly in our project to calculate the costs 
associated in terms of material, labor hours, readiness for the Growler’s engine, and proposed 
afterburner (AB) module repair facility at FRC Northwest.  Although the military typically 
prefers readiness to cost effectiveness (as in the case of aircraft carriers having an engine test 
cell to achieve maximum Aₒ), we also analyzed and compared our findings with existing 
costs incurred at FRC Northwest.  From these findings, we derived recommendations in 
terms of cost savings and effect on Aₒ.  
^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜ=mêçÖê~ã=
dê~Çì~íÉ=pÅÜççä=çÑ=_ìëáåÉëë=C=mìÄäáÅ=mçäáÅó - 24 - 
k~î~ä=mçëíÖê~Çì~íÉ=pÅÜççä=
2. Life-Cycle Cost 
The life-cycle cost (LCC) is an important concept that Jones (2006, p. 11.11) defined 
as  “an inexact process that attempts to gather and use estimate assumptions and historical 
information to predict what may happen in the future and translate the results into cost.”   
The primary reason for developing an LCC model is to estimate the total costs needed to 
support the system over the period of time.  The two major aspects of our LCC model are the 
acquisition costs and the operations and maintenance cost.  For the sake of parsimony, the 
acquisition costs considered in our study only include the acquiring of various components 
for FRC Northwest’s engine test and the initial training.  The operations and maintenance 
include labor, training, and transportation cost savings.  Jones stated, “Although [LCC is] 
imperfect, it is the only tool available to the supportability engineering to assess the impact of 
design, operation, and support decisions on the total program” (2006, p. 11.11).  He further 
explained that “LCC modeling allows the supportability engineering to create a reasonable 
projection of cost based on an assembled data set, and then look at the impact of changes to 
the base line data” (2006, p. 11.11), making the application to our scenario reasonable. 
We calculate the LCC of modifying the engine test cell at FRC Northwest to run the 
F414 engine, which we analyze in the final chapter to assist decision-makers in gauging the 
monetary impacts of any modifications. 
3. Areas of Focus With Regards to Current Operations 
a. Reliability 
Reliability can be used to portray a sense of confidence in a system or the 
probability of satisfactory performance during a given period under specific operating 
conditions.  Reliability of a specific system can be calculated by statistics from one of these 
three sources: 
 use of in-service data from similar equipment, 
 test or trials data (conducted in similar conditions), and 
 generic parts data. 
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b. Mean Time Between Failures 
The MTBF of any component or system provides the maintenance manager 
and decision-makers the average time between two consecutive failures.  It can be calculated 
by dividing the total measured usage of any equipment in a specified time by the total 
occurrences of failures.  
 MTBF 
Total Measured Usage
Number  of  Failures
 (1) 
  
The OEM generally provides the MTBF of any item, but we can also calculate 
it by Equation 1.  It can also be calculated by using Equations 2–4: 
   k    t  (2) 
or 
  (3) 
then 




In these equations,   is the total number of failures during the duration t, k is the total 
number of components,   is the failure rate (reciprocal of the MTBF), and t is the total 
mission duration or the total usage. 
We use Equation 2 for calculating the actual MTBF of the F414 engine at 
NAS Whidbey Island and compare it with the fleet average and the MTBF provided by the 
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c. Operational Availability 
Jones (2006) described availability as “the probability that an item is in 
operable and committable state when called for at an unknown (random) time” (2006, pp. 
10.1–10.6).  The military uses the term Aₒ, which Jones defined as follows: “The actual 
gauge of the availability of a system is the percentage of the time when under actual 
operating conditions it is available to perform its mission” (2006, pp. 10.1–10.6).  Aₒ is 
calculated as shown in Equations 5–7: 
 Ao	 	
	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	
 (5) 
or 
 Ao 	 	 	  (6) 
or 
 Ao 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	
 (7) 
Ao provides the percentage of systems in mission capable status as shown in Equation 8 and, 
therefore, it can be rewritten as 
 Ao 	
	 	 	 	
	 	 	
 (8) 
The efficiency of any system is measured in Aₒ.  The Navy determines a desired level of 
reliability at which its aircraft should be maintained throughout the fleet; therefore, we also 
calculate Aₒ before and after incorporating any changes in the existing repair cycle. 
d. Calculating the Probability of Failure  
In every decision made, some form of risk analysis is performed.  MS Excel 
spreadsheets have the capability to calculate and display various distribution models.  We 
used MS Excel in our analysis in estimating the distribution of the frequency of engine 
failure only due to afterburner failures in the following four scenarios: 
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 Status quo (46 aircraft):  All Growler engines are sent to FRC West for 
repair, taking eight days for transportation to receive a replacement 
RFI engine  
 46 aircraft and F414 engine test cell capability at FRC Northwest 
taking two days to repair an AB failure for spray bars, having the 
engine available for issue 
 114 aircraft with Growler engines are sent to FRC West for repair 
taking eight days for transportation to receive a replacement RFI 
engine 
 114 aircraft and F414 engine test cell capability at NAS Whidbey 
Island, taking two days to repair an AB failure for spray bars and have 
the engine available for issue 
e. Spare Parts Quantity Determination 
Maintaining any level of Aₒ requires a repair facility to possess spare parts in 
order to support corrective and preventative maintenance.  The unavailability of a spare when 
needed results in defective/nonoperational equipment, resulting in loss of Aₒ.  Spare parts are 
often costly in terms of capital; therefore, it is imperative that the number of spares required 
to achieve the desired level of Aₒ be calculated based on anticipated failures.  Jones (2006) 
concluded,  
There is no magic formula that can be used to identify requirement of spares 
because there is no method of spare parts forecasting that can accurately 
predict the future.  The only methods available use either past experience or 
statistical projections of future maintenance activity to estimate the anticipated 
number of spares that will be required for a given period of time in future. 
(2006, p. 18.1) 
For the purpose of this project, we analyzed FRC West’s NALCOMIS data 
and applied various probabilistic statistical models while considering various factors, such as 
equipment usage, maintenance capabilities, age of the system, and so forth, affecting the 
outcome.  To achieve the numbers as accurately as possible, we also added appropriate 
safety-level quantities to provide some margin of error. 
f. Logistics Cycle Time Reduction 
Logistics cycle time is a key element in determining the level of inventories to 
be maintained.  Little’s Law shows the relationship between time and inventory:  As time 
elapses, more inventory is required.  In modern concepts of logistics, time is considered 
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money and can affect the Aₒ of an engine.  The equation I = R × T is relevant because as the 
repair or cycle time is reduced, less inventory is required, which leads to substantial dollar 
savings (where I = inventory, R = rate at which an item is delivered, and T = the time it takes 
to process the item). 
In the current process, the defective engine is shipped from NAS Whidbey 
Island and transported to NAS Lemoore, while at the same time, an RFI engine is sent from 
NAS Lemoore to NAS Whidbey Island.  The transportation time between the two naval air 
stations takes eight days on average.  Modifying the engine test cell to run F414 engines and 
having limited AB module repair capability at FRC Northwest (keeping the repair time and 
testing time same at both stations) may enable Growler squadrons at NAS Whidbey Island to 
save 14 days of transportation time.  We calculated the effect of this reduction on inventory, 
overall cost, and Aₒ of the engine. 
g. Inventory Carrying Cost 
The concept of inventory carrying costs explains the often-obscure costs 
associated with carrying inventory.  Inventory costs can amount to substantial amounts of 
money and negatively impact the organization’s financial position.  For example, inventory 
that sits idle ties up capital investment and generates extra labor and storage costs, which 
could have been utilized towards a more rewarding project or investment.  In the LCC model, 
we use an annual inventory carrying rates of 10% and 15% to show how this can change an 
organization’s net present value.    
h. Data Sources 
The primary sources referenced in the following list were the informational 
base we used as we constructed this document.  The persons referenced by title are the 
subject-matter experts in their particular fields or persons directly involved with the subject. 
 PMA-265 Deputy Assistant Program Manager for Logistics supplied the reliability of 
the engine through the mean engine flight hours between removal/repair for the F414 
engine and associated modules.   
 Electronic Attack Wing’s Analyst provided 2012’s operating hours for the Growler in 
terms of RFT/RBA and the flight hours that were flown.   
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 FRC Northwest Database Administrator extracted our primary data from the Aviation 
Financial Analysis Tool and Deckplate databases. 
 FRC West 400 Division Officer provided the division’s monthly production report. 
 FRC West 400 Division Production Control’s Supervisor provided Deckplate data, 
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V. ANALYSIS 
In this chapter, we provide an analysis of the present scenario of the repair and 
maintenance process of Growler engines at FRC Northwest by presenting four different 
scenarios.  While analyzing the processes at FRC Northwest, we calculated the Aₒ of the 
Growler engine and certain costs associated with the repair of the F414 engine. We then  
calculated the frequency of potential stock outs related to an AB failure. We also calculated 
the impact of transportation time and protection level upon the spare engine pool at NAS 
Whidbey Island.  The operation of the Growler and its engine are very complex procedures; 
therefore, we used certain assumptions to make the study conclusive and easier to understand.  
A. ASSUMPTIONS 
For the sake of simplicity and understandability, we made certain assumptions 
throughout the study: 
 We are only concerned with the Growler’s engines.   
 There are two spare engines kept at NAS Whidbey Island for the Growler squadrons.  It 
takes eight days to ship an RFI engine from NAS Lemoore to NAS Whidbey Island.   
 FRC West is able to support the quantity of engines ordered by Growler squadrons, and 
there are no delays in terms of transportation. 
 The infrastructure required for FRC Northwest’s engine test cell is currently in place (the 
test cell for the J-52 engine).  
 The only costs incurred are those particular to the F414 engine and additional manpower 
required. 
 The various costs incurred upon operating an engine test cell will remain the same 
throughout the enterprise, whether it is run at FRC West or FRC Northwest. 
 The Growler is fitted with two F414-GE-400 engines; in case of an engine failure, the 
aircraft is not mission capable. 
 We are using the actual data of calendar year 2012, and the average number of flying 
hours per Growler will remain constant for years to come. 
 There are 46 Growlers in the present scenario and this will increase to 114, which is the 
total number of aircraft at the completion of the acquisition process in year 2018 
(increasing by 12 per year until 2018 where eight will complete the acquisition). 
 
 The cost of the F414-GE-400 engine is about $3.7 million.   
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B. CALCULATING THE ENGINE Aₒ IN THE PRESENT SCENARIO 
Aₒ is considered to be the best possible measure for performance.  Measuring the 
performance of the current repair/maintenance system, we calculated the actual Aₒ of the 
Growler’s engine for the calendar year 2012 using actual engine failures and instances of 
stock outs.  We plotted the engines that were ordered by the Growler squadrons and 
compared them with NAS Whidbey Island’s spare engine pool of two.  With the assumption 
that Whidbey Island receives an RFI engine within eight days of an engine being ordered, we 
found that there were seven instances when three engine failures occurred within this eight-
day period, resulting in a stock out of an engine for one day.  In order to find the Growler 
engine’s actual Aₒ, we used Equation 9 based on the previously mentioned parameters.  
ₒ
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 #	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	
 











 Ao  99.95% 	
This extremely high Aₒ is due to the fact that Growler is a new aircraft, and during 
calendar year 2012 there were 30 engine failures.  Of those 30 engine failures, 93.3% of the 
time, the squadrons were able to replace the defective engine with an RFI engine from the 
spare pool at NAS Whidbey Island.  In seven instances, which comprised the remaining 6.7% 
of the time, squadrons were not able to replace the defective engine due to a stock out in the 
spare pool, which resulted in an aircraft being non-operational. 
C. CALCULATING THE PRESENT MEAN TIME BETWEEN FAILURES 
AT WHIDBEY ISLAND 
From the actual set of data, there were 30 occurrences of F414 engine failures at NAS 
Whidbey Island during the calendar year of 2012.  We calculated that each Growler flew an 
average of 374.413 hours (17,223 budgeted hours during year 2012 divided by 46 aircraft) 
during the same period.  Because there were 46 Growlers at NAS Whidbey Island, we can 
calculate the actual MTBF obtained for the Growler’s engine by using Equation 3.  
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 1,148.2  (10) 
The MTBF of the F414 engine for the entire fleet (including F/A-18 Super Hornet squadrons) 
is 582 hours, whereas the calculated MTBF for the Growler’s engine is 1,148.2 hours as 
shown in Equation 10.  The difference between the MTBFs can be attributed to the Growler’s 
F414 engines being newer compared to the Super Hornets’.  As the Growler continues to 
operate, their newer engines will become intermixed with the rest of the fleet’s spare pool 
through the repair cycle; thus, their engine MTBF will be lower and normalize to the fleet’s 
MTBF. 
D. CALCULATING THE AVERAGE NUMBER OF ENGINE FAILURES 
BY USING FLEET MEAN TIME BETWEEN FAILURES 
After first calculating the average number of failures for the year using Equation 2, 
the fleet’s MTBF of 582 hours (for 46 aircraft or k = 92 engines), and assuming annual flight 
hours per aircraft of 374.413 (17,223 budgeted hours divided by 46 aircraft), we then 
calculated there would have been 60 failures, compared to the 30 actual occurrences during 
the year (see Table 1). 
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 Average Number of Engine Failures Using Fleet Mean Time Between Failures Table 1.  
for 46 Aircraft 
# of components failure rate flight hours per year exp # of failures during the mission
k λ t μ=kλt
92 0.00171821 374.4130435 59.18556701  
Similarly in Table 2, with 114 aircraft (k = 228 engines), with the same number of 
average flight hours per aircraft, we calculated that there would have been approximately 147 
engine failures during the year.  
 Average Number of Engine Failures Using Fleet Mean Time Between Failures Table 2.  
for 114 Aircraft 
# of components failure rate flight hours per year exp # of failures during the mission
k λ t μ=kλt
228 0.001718213 374.4130435 146.6772748  
Our observations show that Growlers at NAS Whidbey Island have experienced an 
engine failure rate 50% below the fleet average.  Again, this can be attributed to the 
Growler’s newer engines. 
E. CALCULATING THE ENGINE TRANSPORTATION COSTS IN THE 
PRESENT SCENARIO 
Due to the non-availability of repair capability for Growler engines at FRC Northwest 
there is an incurred cost to send a defective engine to FRC West for repair.  From the data 
obtained from NAS Whidbey Island’s Aviation Supply Detachment, it costs an average of 
$1,713.50 to transport an engine from NAS Whidbey Island to NAS Lemoore, equating to 
$3,427 round trip.  On average, it takes eight days of travel time for the one-way trip.  We 
assume that no matter where the defective engine is repaired, FRC Northwest or FRC West, 
all repair costs (other than transportation) will remain the same.  Therefore, we can calculate 
that from the 30 actual defective engines that were experienced at NAS Whidbey Island 
during 2012, the shipping costs should have been $102,810 and 480 days of transit time 
should have occurred.  By using the present MTBF calculated in Equation 10 for NAS 
Whidbey Island (i.e., 1,148.2 hours) the forecasted engine failure using Equation 2, with 114 
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aircraft, will be 75 engines.  This will increase the transportation costs to $257,025 (75 
engines × 3,427) and will encompass 1,200 days of transit time. 
F. CALCULATING THE ENGINE TRANSPORTATION COSTS USING 
FLEET MEAN TIME BETWEEN FAILURE 
Using the fleet’s MTBF we previously calculated (see Table 1) the number of 
expected engine failures of 46 Growlers to be 60.  With 114 Growlers, the expected number 
of engine failures using the fleet’s MTBF is approximately 147, as shown in Table 2.  As the 
Growlers’ newer engines age, their MTBF will normalize to the fleet’s average.  This will 
also affect the transportation cost of engine repair as follows: 
With current strength of 46 aircraft:  60 engines × $3,427 (cost of transportation) = 
$205,620 per year 
With current strength of 114 aircraft:  1,470 engines × $3,427 (cost of transportation) 
= $503,769 per year 
G. IMPACTS OF TRANSPORTATION TIME UPON THE SPARE 
ENGINE POOL 
1. Calculating the Number of Spare Engines for 46 Aircraft With a 
Transportation Time of Four Days  
By reducing the shipping time to seven days, when supporting 46 Growlers, Aₒ will 
improve but will not have an effect on the required number of spare engines.  To reduce the 
number of spares engines from two to one would require TAT to be reduced to four days, 
which would lower our inventory.  As shown in Equation 11, the mission duration time 
during the four days of shipping would equate to 4.1 flight hours (see Table 3). 
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 Number of Spare Engines for 46 Aircraft With a Transportation Time of Four Table 3.  
Days  
# of components failure rate flight hours per year exp # of failures during the mission
k λ t μ=kλt
92 0.001718213 4.103156641 0.648608954
Protection Level 0.85 Required Spares                                     1
 
2. Calculating the Number of Spare Engines for 114 Aircraft With a 
Transportation Time of Six Days  
Similarly, having 114 aircraft and reducing TAT by two days would lessen the 
number of spare engines required from five to four.  This reduction in spares would not have 
an effect on the Aₒ of the aircraft, but would reduce the total inventory required from five to 
four spare engines (see Table 4). 
 Number of Spare Engines for 114 Aircraft With a Transportation Time of Six Table 4.  
Days  
# of components failure rate flight hours per year exp # of failures during the mission
k λ t μ=kλt
228 0.001718213 6.154734961 2.411133284
Protection Level 0.85 Required Spares                                     4
 
H. IMPACT OF PROTECTION LEVEL UPON THE SPARE ENGINE 
POOL 
1. Calculating the Number of Spare Engines for 46 Aircraft With an 85% 
Protection Level 
Being able to maintain a certain ready basic aircraft (RBA)/ready for tasking (RFT) 
requires a certain number of spare engines to be available at FRC Northwest.  There are 
currently two spare engines on hand to support the Growler squadrons at NAS Whidbey 
Island.  Utilizing the fleet’s MTBF of 582 hours and 17,223 flight hours flown by the 
Growler during calendar year 2012, we can calculate the number of spare engines required at 
NAS Whidbey Island.  Based on 17,223 flight hours in 2012, each of the 46 Growlers flew 
an average of 31.2 flight hours per month.  The engine repair TAT is eight days, which is the 
transportation time between the two naval air stations.  The mission duration, as shown in 
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Equation 12, during the TAT, or t applied, is 8.2 flight hours.  The results of applying these 
values in a Poisson spare parts calculation formula, while assuming a protection level of 85%, 
are displayed in Equation 12 and in Table 5: 
Total budgeted hours during 2012 = 17,223 hours 
Number of aircraft = 46 
Transportation Time = 8 days 

















 Number of Spare Engines for 46 Aircraft With an 85% Protection Level Table 5.  
# of components failure rate flight hours per year exp # of failures during the mission
k λ t μ=kλt
92 0.001718213 8.206313282 1.297217907
Protection Level 0.85 Required Spares                                  2  
Table 5 validates the quantity of spare engines presently at NAS Whidbey Island as 
per the model.  Due to the Growlers’ newer engines, the actual achieved protection level for 
the spare engine pool at NAS Whidbey Island was 93.3%, higher than the target value.   
2. Calculating the Number of Spare Engines for 46 Aircraft With a 90% 
Protection Level 
Currently, there are 46 Growlers at NAS Whidbey Island.  As shown in Table 6, if the 
Growler Wing decided to increase its protection level to 90%, an additional engine would be 
required at a cost of $3.7 million. 
 Number of Spare Engines for 46 Aircraft With a 90% Protection Level Table 6.  
# of components failure rate flight hours per year exp # of failures during the mission
k λ t μ=kλt
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3. Calculating the Number of Spare Engines for 114 Aircraft With an 85% 
Protection Level 
When the full complement of 114 Growlers is received and operational at NAS 
Whidbey Island, the number of spare engines (following a similar MTBF, flying hours, and 
TAT) required to support an 85% protection level will increase to five (see Table 7).  
 Number of Spare Engines for 114 Aircraft With an 85% Protection Level Table 7.  
# of components failure rate flight hours per year exp # of failures during the mission
k λ t μ=kλt
228 0.001718213 8.206313282 3.214844378
Protection Level 0.85 Required Spares                                     5
 
4. Calculating the Number of Spare Engines for 114 Aircraft With a 90% 
Protection Level 
Increasing the protection level from 85% to 90% with 114 Growlers, keeping the 
failure rate and mission duration as per the base case, would require an additional engine at a 
cost of $3.7 million (see Table 8). 
 Number of Spare Engines for 114 Aircraft With a 90% Protection Level Table 8.  
# of components failure rate flight hours per year exp # of failures during the mission
k λ t μ=kλt
228 0.001718213 8.206313282 3.214844378
Protection Level 0.90 Required Spares                                     6
 
I. EFFECTS OF LIMITED REPAIR CAPABILITY AND UPGRADING 
ENGINE TEST CELL UPON ENGINE SPARE POOL 
1. Calculating the effective  of AB Module 
Using fleet MTBF when determining the failure rate of the F414 engine is correct; however, 
it is misleading to use the fleet’s MTBF when calculating the failure rate of the Growler’s 
AB module.  Fleet MTBF is composed of not only engine discrepancies but also of scheduled 
maintenance.  FRC West has the capability to perform MEIs on engines, replace modules, 
and perform AB repair.  When a non-RFI engine is inducted at FRC West for repair, it is 
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often the case that one or more modules other than the defective module the engine was 
turned in for will need replacement.  This is attributed to other modules approaching their 
scheduled maintenance time.  Because FRC Northwest would not have the capability to 
replace engine modules, effective(AB)  should be used in lieu of fleet MTBF to calculate the 
failure rate of the Growler’s AB.  effective(AB)  removes the scheduled maintenance portion of 
the Growler’s AB’s   when calculating the failure rate.  To calculate effective(AB) , it is 
necessary to subtract the frequency of scheduled maintenance from the  (AB), the AB 
module failure rate including scheduled maintenance.  As discussed in the Planned 
Maintenance System Section, scheduled maintenance based on hours can be performed 
within a window of 10% of the time at which the maintenance is due (Table 9).  The AB 
Modules have an MTBF of 673 hours and a scheduled removal of 2,000 hours that are used 
to calculate effective(AB) . 
 Scheduled Maintenance Interval and Window for F414 Engine Modules Table 9.  
Module Scheduled Maintenance Lower Limit Upper Limit
Interval (hours) -10% +10%
Fan 2,000                                1,800             2,200         
HPC 1,700                                1,530             1,870         
Combustor 4,000                                3,600             4,400         
HPT 2,220                                1,998             2,442         
LPT 4,000                                3,600             4,400         
AB 2,000                                 
The formula and calculation of effective(AB) is displayed in Equation 13: 






effective AB      
2. Calculating the Probability That Only the AB Module Will Need to Be 
Replaced  
Since FRC Northwest would only have limited repair capability for the AB module, 
calculating the probability that no other modules would need replacement due to scheduled 
maintenance is required.  Regardless if FRC Northwest has limited repair capability, the 
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engine would still need to be sent to FRC West when any module is within their tolerances of 
schedule maintenance.  The probability that the age of a particular module at any arbitrary 
point is less than the its lower limit as shown in Table 9 can be expressed as the lower limit 
divided by the upper limit.  In this case, the particular module does not need replacement.  
Thus the probability that only an AB module fails and no other module is above the lower 
limit of its scheduled maintenance interval is the product of dividing the lower limit of the 
inspection interval by the upper limit for each module.  The formula for calculating this 
probability (Pr) is shown in Equation 14. 
Pr (Only AB module fails and no other module is above the lower limit of its 

























 = 0.366 
This shows that there is a 36.6% probability that in case of an AB failure, no other 
module will need replacement due to having reached the lower limit of its scheduled 
maintenance interval.  The remaining 63.4% of the time when an AB module fails, there will 
be at least one other module that needs replacement due to reaching the lower limit of its 
scheduled maintenance interval; in which case, the engine will not be repaired at FRC 
Northwest. 
3. Calculating the Frequency of AB Failures With 46 and 114 Aircraft 
a. Excel Poisson Distribution Function 
Utilizing Microsoft Excel, we used the Poisson distribution to calculate the frequency 
of AB module failures, which provided the number of engine failures attributed to the AB 
module.  In  the current scenario there are eight days of transportation time from when an 
engine is ordered by a Growler squadron until it is received from FRC West.  When FRC 
Northwest has an upgraded engine test cell there will be a two-day TAT, from the time an 
engine is faulty for a spray bar issue until it is RFI.  A probability frequency chart was 
constructed to find the number of occurrences when an AB module will fail during each 
scenario.  From these changes in frequency, we can argue whether it would be worthwhile to 
^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜ=mêçÖê~ã=
dê~Çì~íÉ=pÅÜççä=çÑ=_ìëáåÉëë=C=mìÄäáÅ=mçäáÅó - 41 - 
k~î~ä=mçëíÖê~Çì~íÉ=pÅÜççä=
have an updated engine test cell at FRC Northwest in order to perform limited repairs of the 
AB module. 
b. Building the Probability Chart 
The probability chart was based on the equation ( ) ( ) (   maintenance)effective AB AB AB scheduled     
(t is in terms of per day and multiplied by eight, to take into account the eight days of 
transportation from FRC West to replenish a non-RFI engine).  By calculating the probability 
of failure for each of the two scenarios (one for eight days and the other for two days), we 
applied the Poisson distribution to each failure rate.  The distribution showed the number of 
engine failures due to the AB module during the TAT. 
Tables 10 and 11 depict the probability of failure due to the AB module with 46 and 
114 aircraft, respectively.  In the current scenario (with 46 aircraft and eight days of 
transportation time) there is a probability of 76.1% that there are no failures, 20.8% that there 
is one failure, 2.8% that there are two failures, and less than 0.3% that there are three or more 
failures relating to the AB module.  When the full complement of Growler aircraft are based 
at NAS Whidbey Island, the probability is 50.8% that there are no failures, 6.4% that there is 
one failure, and less than 0.022% that there are two or more failures relating to the AB 
module.  In each table, the two-day scenarios reflect how the engine test cell would reduce 
the turn around rate, thus increasing the operational availability of the engine.  These 
probabilities assume that the other modules within the Growler engine do not fail or have 
scheduled maintenance.  We can only estimate that there will be an incremental improvement 
of the engine operational availability with an engine test cell.  
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4. Calculating Average Number of Engine Failures Due to Spray Bars in the 
AB Module 
Using Equation 2, where λ is λeffective(AB), we calculated in Table 12 that there are 13 
AB failures for 46 aircraft during one year.  The calculations of k, ( )effective AB , and  t are 
shown in Equations 15 to 17.  











 0.366  0.0003608
 (16) 
 t = 17,223 ÷ 46 = 374.4130435 (17) 
 Average Number of Engine Failures Due to AB Module for 46 Aircraft Table 12.  
# of components failure rate flight hours per year exp # of failures during the mission
k λ t μ=kλt
92 0.000360834 374.4130435 12.42927353
 
From the NALCOMIS data, we derived that 66.61% of AB module defects were 
attributed to main spray bars. We multiplied the fleet’s spray bar failure rate of 66.61% to the 
 calculated in Table 12.  Using Equation 18, we derived ( ) with spray bar failureeffective AB .  The new 
calculations are shown in Table 13.  
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 ( )( ) with spray bar failu (  Prore bability) =   AB effe SprayBarFailurective ABeffective AB    (18) 
 ( )  with spray bar failure
1 1
 –   0.366  0.6661  0.000240351 = 
673 2000effective AB
         
 
 Average Number of Engine Failures Due to Spray Bars for 46 Aircraft Table 13.  
# of components failure rate flight hours per year exp # of failures during the mission
k λ t μ=kλt
92 0.000240351 374.4130435 8.279139099
 
Table 13 shows that about nine engines (8.3 was rounded up) per year would be affected by 
spray bar-related issues in the AB module.  If FRC Northwest were to receive limited repair 
capability and an upgraded engine test cell, these nine engines could be repaired. 
We recalculated for 114 aircraft k  114  2  228  in Table 14, while keeping  and 
t the same as in Table 13 and found that on average 21 engine failures per year would be 
attributed to defective spray bars in the AB module.  These 21 engines could be repaired by 
FRC Northwest. 
 Average Number of Engine Failures Due to Spray Bars for 114 Aircraft Table 14.  
# of components failure rate flight hours per year exp # of failures during the mission
k λ t μ=kλt
228 0.000240351 374.4130435 20.51786646
 
5. Calculating the Cost of Transportation for Engines Having AB Module 
(Main Spray Bar) Defects  
To calculate the number of Growler ABs affected by spray bar-related issues, under 
the present scenario of 46 aircraft, we calculated in Table 13 that approximately nine AB 
failures would be attributed to defective spray bars in AB modules.  The cost of 
transportation would be $30,843 per year 
  nine engines  $3, 427 transportation cos t of  an engine .  With the full complement of 
114 aircraft, there would be 21 engine failures attributed to defective spray bars in AB 
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modules.  The cost of shipping 21 engines (round trip) between the two naval air stations 
would be $71,967 per year  21 engines  $3, 427 transportation cos t of  an engine . 
6. Calculating the Cost of Upgrading FRC Northwest’s Engine Test Cell 
On April 30, 2012, a site survey was conducted to analyze the requirements needed to 
run F414 engines at FRC Northwest.  Taking into account common equipment already in 
place, the equipment cost of upgrading the engine test cell would be approximately $500,000.  
Currently, there are no personnel qualified to run this engine at FRC Northwest, and it is 
assumed that the test cell would need additional manpower.  The costs are broken down in 
Tables 15 and 16: 
 F414 Test Cell Operator Annual Allowances and Costs Table 15.  
Pay Grade Allowance Total Cost
AD3 (E-4) 3 199,206.00$  
AD2 (E-5) 2 163,760.00$  
ADC (E-7) 1 109,814.00$  
472,780.00$  
109,814.00$         
Annual DoD
Composite Rate
Billets for Navy Enlisted Classification Code 6422 (Test Cell Operator) Cost
66,402.00$           
81,880.00$           
 
We used the DoD Military Personnel Composite Standard Pay and Reimbursement Rates for 
FY 2013 from the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (OUSD; 2012) to calculate each 
operator’s cost.   
 F414 Test Cell Equipment Costs Table 16.  
Nomenclature Cost
Peculiar Support Equipment 298,000.00$  
Software Upgrade 100,000.00$  
Vibration Card 30,000.00$    
Modification of Fuel Lines 12,000.00$    
Engine Correlation 60,000.00$    
Total 500,000.00$  
Fleet Readiness Center Northwest Test Cell Equipment Costs
 
From the figures we gathered from FRC Northwest, we itemized the cost of upgrading the 
engine test cell.  As shown in Table 16, the one-time test cell equipment upgrade cost would 
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be $500,000.  We also assumed that $50,000 per year would be required to operate and 
maintain the test cell equipment.  An initial training cost of $2,300 per operator would be 
incurred upon upgrading the engine test cell.  Additional operators would be able to qualify 
through on-the-job training at FRC Northwest. 
J. LIFE-CYCLE COST AND EFFECTS ON OPERATIONAL 
AVAILABILITY OF THE GROWLER AFTER MODIFYING FRC 
NORTHWEST’S ENGINE TEST CELL  
The LCC analyzes the financial aspects of upgrading FRC Northwest’s engine test 
cell to be configured to run F414-GE-400 engines.  Prior to the test cell being upgraded, the 
Ao of the Growler engine was 99.95%.  Assuming that FRC Northwest acquired test cell 
capability for the F414, we constructed an Excel spreadsheet covering a 30-year timespan to 
compute basic net present value.  We assumed that there would be an incremental increase to 
the Growler inventory by 12 aircraft per year until fiscal year (FY) 2018, when the final eight 
aircraft would be delivered and complete the 114 aircraft acquisition (see Tables 19–20).  We 
also assumed the failure rates in terms of the AB module to remain with the fleet’s averages 
(see Table 18). 
For this type of internal government investment, we used the real capital discount rate 
of 1.1% per year promulgated by the Office of Management and Budget through Circular A-
94 (OMB, 2012).  This 1.1% represents the real Treasury borrowing rate, the difference 
between the nominal interest rates of 3.0% on treasury notes and bonds, and an inflation rate 
of 1.9% for FY 2013.   
The engine carrying cost is another factor that we considered in terms of cost 
avoidance for FRC Northwest if it had an engine test cell.  To calculate the number of 
engines in the spare pool without the engine test cell, we used Excel with Visual Basic 
Application of the Poisson distribution to find the average number of expected failures 
during the transportation time of eight days using engine (as we did in Table 1) with a 
protection level of 85%.  We then calculated the number of engines the spare pool should 
have when FRC Northwest is able to perform limited repairs to the AB and has an upgraded 
engine test cell.  The parameters of the calculations were the same except for the   (which is 
shown in Equation 19).  The difference of engines in the spare pool shows a potential savings 
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in terms of being able to decrease the engine pool size.  We used 10% and 15% of the 
engine’s value to compute the annual engine carrying cost, which was only applied when we 
were able to save an engine from the inventory at FRC Northwest as shown in Table 17.   
 ( ) with spray bar failure – engine effective AB    (19) 
 
1 1 1
   –   –    0.366  0.6661   0.00148
582 673 2000

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To calculate the number of expected Growler engine failures in future years, we used 
Equation 2, assuming the AB’s MTBF remained at 673 hours and the mission duration of a 
Growler was 374.41 flight hours annually.  The following example shows this calculation for 
2013 (see Table 18): 
  58 aircraft× 2 engines=116 engines at NAS Whidbey Islandk  (20) 









 0.366  0.0003608  (21) 
 t 
17, 223
  374.41 annual flight hours per aircraft
46
   (22) 
  116  0.0003608  374.41 15.671engines failed due to the AB only (23) 
Spray bar issues  15.671 66.61% 11engines failed due to the spray bar issue only (24) 
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 Annual F414 AB Spray Bar Failures Table 18.  
A/C Engine AB Failure LMainSpray
2013 58 116 15.6717 11
2014 70 140 18.9141 13
2015 82 164 22.1565 15
2016 94 188 25.399 17
2017 106 212 28.6413 20
2018 114 228 30.803 21
2042 114 228 30.803 21
2019 ‐ 2041 are same numbers
 
The Life-Cycle Cost Models depicted in Tables 19–20 display a 30-year timespan.  
We assumed the Prowlers would have been phased out at the completion of the Growler’s 
transition in FY 2018.  We also estimated an additional operations and maintenance cost of 
$50,000 once the Prowlers were phased out to keep the engine test cell functional.  We used 
Table 18’s spray bar failures as the number of engines that would be repaired at FRC 
Northwest.  These engines would also have an effect on transportation cost avoidance of 
$3,427 per engine’s round trip.  Table 15’s figures were used for the additional personnel 
cost to operate the upgraded engine test cell.  It is estimated that it would cost $2,300 per 
operator for the initial training.  With six personnel as show in Table 15, this cost would be 
$13,800.  Table 16’s total cost was used for the initial capital investment.  Table 17 shows 
how the engine cost avoidance was calculated.  With all these calculations, we were able to 
determine if the project of upgrading the engine test cell at FRC Northwest is a worthwhile 
venture. 
Table 19 shows the yearly net cash flow is a negative number, resulting in the net 
present value (NPV) being approximately a negative $3.5 million.  Table 19 uses an engine 
carrying cost of 10% while keeping the transportation and personnel costs constant over the 
30-year period.  Using the NPV Decision Rule, we determined this project is not worth 
investing in due to a negative NPV. 
In Table 20 we recalculated the Life-Cycle Cost Model using a 15% engine carrying 
cost in terms of a sensitivity analysis.  While the yearly net cash flow was mostly positive, 
the net NPV result was a minuscule positive number.  We used the NPV Decision Rule again 
to determine if the project would be viable.  Although the NPV was positive, we determined 
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this project would not be worthy of investment because the engine failure rates are 
overestimated since the Growler engines are still relatively new.  Thus, the actual costs 
expected should be lower than those we used in this analysis. 
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 Life-Cycle Costs at an Engine Carrying Rate of 10% Table 19.  
1.1%
Net Present Value: ‐$3,459,663 11 13 15 17 20 21 21
Number of Aircraft 58         70         82         94         106       114        114       




Personnel $472,780 $472,780 $472,780 $472,780 $472,780 $472,780 $472,780
Transportation Cost (savings) $37,704 $44,559 $51,414 $58,269 $68,552 $71,979 $71,979
Engine Cost Avoidance $0 $0 $370,623 $0 $370,623 $370,623 $370,623
Acquistion & Capital Investment $513,800 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $50,000 $50,000
$472,780 $472,780 $472,780 $472,780 $472,780 $472,780 $472,780
Revenue/Savings $37,704 $44,559 $422,037 $58,269 $439,175 $442,602 $442,602
Net Cash Flow  ‐$513,800 ‐$435,076 ‐$428,221 ‐$50,743 ‐$414,511 ‐$93,729 ‐$80,178 ‐$80,178
Year‐‐> 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 … 30
Engine Carrying Cost of 10%
R&D, O&M, and other costs
Life-Cycle Cost Worksheet
YR
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 Life-Cycle Costs at an Engine Carrying Rate of 15% Table 20.  
1.1%
Net Present Value: $666,298 11 13 15 17 20 21 21
Number of Aircraft 58           70          82           94          106          114          114          




Personnel $472,780 $472,780 $472,780 $472,780 $472,780 $472,780 $472,780
Transportation Cost (savings) $37,704 $44,559 $51,414 $58,269 $68,552 $71,979 $71,979
Engine Cost Avoidance $0 $0 $555,935 $0 $555,935 $555,935 $555,935
Acquistion & Capital Investmen $513,800 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $50,000 $50,000
$472,780 $472,780 $472,780 $472,780 $472,780 $472,780 $472,780
Revenue/Savings $37,704 $44,559 $607,349 $58,269 $624,487 $627,914 $627,914
Net Cash Flow  ‐$513,800 ‐$435,076 ‐$428,221 $134,569 ‐$414,511 $151,707 $105,134 $105,134
Year‐‐> 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 … 30
Engine Carrying Cost of 15%
R&D, O&M, and other costs
Life-Cycle Cost Worksheet
YR
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VI. RESULTS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
In this chapter, we present the results of the analysis, recommendations, and areas for 
further research.  The research question of the project was, Should FRC Northwest gain 
limited repair capability for the F414-GE-400 engine, including updating its existing engine 
test cell?  We analyzed the present scenario at FRC Northwest, without the limited repair 
capability and engine test cell, and then simulated a scenario where FRC Northwest was 
provided with limited repair capability and an updated engine test cell.  Both of the scenarios 
were then compared in terms of availability of engines in the spare engine pool.  
A. RESULTS 
1. Calculating the Number of Engine Failures Due to Spray Bar Issue in the 
AB Module 
As the research question regards providing limited repair capability and updating the 
existing engine test cell, enabling FRC Northwest to repair the spray bars in the AB module, 
we calculated the number of engines that would be affected by this issue.  Our calculations 
show that in the present scenario (with 46 Growlers), an average of nine engine failures per 
year would be attributed to spray bar issues in the AB module.  Once the number of Growlers 
reaches 114, our calculations show an average of 21 engine failures per year would be 
attributed to spray bar issues in the AB module. 
2. Calculating the Number of Spare Engines 
We calculated the number of spare engines required in the present scenario (using 
fleet MTBF) and validated the two spare engines currently held at NAS Whidbey Island, 
considering a protection level of 85%.  The same process was repeated for the scenario of 
114 Growlers operating at NAS Whidbey Island.  The result of this calculation using fleet 
MTBF suggested that five spare engines would be required, once operating at the full 
planned complement.  This calculation was important to determine if we can reduce the 
number of engines in the spare pool and reduce the inventory carrying cost. 
With 46 aircraft, by adding an additional engine to the spare engine pool, a maximum 
protection level of 95% could be achieved at a cost of $3.7 million.  For 114 aircraft, five 
spare engines would provide a protection level up to a maximum of 89%.  By adding an 
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engine to the spare pool, a maximum protection level of 95% could be achieved at a cost of 
$3.7 million.  Similarly, we calculated the effect of reduction in transportation time on the 
spare engine pool.  By reducing the transportation time from eight to four days for 46 aircraft, 
we were able to reduce the spare engine pool by one engine.  For 114 aircraft, to reduce the 
spare engine pool by one engine would require a reduction in transportation time of two days. 
3. Calculating the Transportation Costs 
We calculated the transportation costs for both the scenarios (FRC Northwest with 
and without limited repair capability for the F414 engine, including updating the existing 
engine test cell).  It costs $3,427 to transport an F414 engine round trip between NAS 
Whidbey Island and NAS Lemoore. The transportation costs for nine engines per year 
(equating to $30,843 per year) could be saved after providing FRC Northwest with limited 
repair capability for the Growler’s F414 engine, including updating the existing engine test 
cell.  For the full complement of 114 Growlers, the savings would be for 21 engines per year 
(equating to $71,967 per year).  Based on the data and our assumptions, it costs $500,000 (in 
acquisition costs) and $13,800 for initial training to upgrade FRC Northwest’s existing 
engine test cell.   The proposed limited F414 engine test cell also requires an additional 
manpower cost of $472,780 per year. 
4. Calculating the Life-Cycle Costs of Upgrading FRC Northwest’s Engine 
Test Cell and Providing Limited F414 Engine Repair Capability 
We computed the LCC over a 30-year life cycle, beginning with 58 Growlers in FY 
2013, and increasing at a rate of 12 aircraft per year until FY 2018 using the real capital 
discount rate of 1.1%.  We assumed that transportation and personnel costs would remain 
constant and estimated $50,000 as an upkeep cost for the engine test cell, beginning in FY 
2018 through FY 2042.  When examining the LCC models and evaluating their NPVs, the 
choice of having an engine test cell at FRC Northwest is not a sound decision because the 
Growler’s engines are relatively new, resulting in a higher operational availability.  As 
additional Growlers join the fleet, their MTBF will continue to be above the fleet’s average 
for a considerable amount of time.  Our calculations for the LCC were based on the fleet’s 
F414 engine MTBF and, thus, overstate the costs that would be incurred.  
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5. Probability of Afterburner Failures and Effects on FRC Northwest’s 
Spare Engine Pool 
The spare engine pool is stocked based upon the MTBF of the entire engine.  Since 
the AB is one of six modules that comprise the Growler engine, as shown in Tables 10 and 
11, reducing the repair time of the AB module would have a minimal effect on the spare 
engine pool.  Thus it is hard to estimate how much utility an engine test cell would add to the 
repair process. 
B. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Based on the results of our analysis, we do not recommend providing FRC Northwest 
with limited repair capability (i.e., enabling FRC Northwest to repair the spray bars in the AB 
module) for the Growler’s F414 engine, or updating the existing engine test cell.  The 
reasons/arguments for this recommendation are listed. 
1. Additional Operating Costs vs. Engine Carrying Avoidance 
In Chapter V, we calculated an annual operating cost of $472,780 (which will 
increase to $522,780 beginning in FY 2018) for FRC Northwest’s upgraded engine test cell.  
When we calculated our LCC using a 10% annual engine carrying cost, it resulted in a 
negative NPV; hence, it was not considered.  When we utilized an engine carrying cost of 
15%, the result was a positive NPV of $666,298 during a 30-year period.  However, the 
engine carrying avoidance was not fully experienced (meaning a positive net cash flow) until 
FY 2017 and continued till FY 2042.  This means that the operations and maintenance costs 
were not off-set by the engine carrying avoidance until FY 2017.  While the NPV is positive, 
it is not recommended for FRC Northwest to invest additional resources to gain a minimal 
return on investment. 
2. Effect on the Number of Spare Engines Required 
During our analysis, we calculated the number of spare engines required and whether 
we could reduce the number of engines by incorporating the proposed limited repair 
capability.  We concluded that one engine could be reduced from the spare pool without a 
loss of a valuable protection level when upgrading the engine test cell.  The reduction of an 
engine from the spare pool would result in monetary savings because the enterprise would 
have to purchase fewer replacement modules/engines in the future.  However, the fleet-wide 
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effect of reducing one spare engine from NAS Whidbey Island’s spare pool would be 
relatively small to the overall enterprise.  Therefore, upgrading the FRC Northwest engine 
test cell is not recommended.  
3. Concept of Fleet Readiness Center/Center of Excellence and Centralized 
vs. Decentralized Facilities 
Providing limited F414 engine repair capability at FRC Northwest does not match the 
NAVAIR concept of FRCs/Centers of Excellence.  This concept, implemented in 2006, 
integrated the ashore IMA and the depot as one repair facility.  The current process enables 
FRC personnel to examine an engine irrespective of defective module.  This inspection 
allows for the replacement of any approaching high time components and repair of any 
discrepancies identified during the major engine inspection (MEI).  Providing FRC 
Northwest with limited repair capability of the AB module would allow them to interdict 
spray bar-related issues; however, they would not have the capability to perform MEIs and, 
thus, miss discrepancies that otherwise would have been corrected.  Adding limited AB 
module repair capability at FRC Northwest would result in maintenance being duplicated at 
FRC West.  
The FRC concept is also in line with established business theory regarding centralized 
versus decentralized facilities.  Utilizing centralized facilities, such as FRC West, results in 
lower safety stocks and overhead while greater economies of scale can be taken advantage of.  
The disadvantages of centralized facilities are longer lead-times and increased transportation 
costs.  In our study, these disadvantages do not outweigh the advantages.  
C. AREAS OF FURTHER RESEARCH 
The objective of this project was to make a recommendation for or against providing 
limited engine repair capability pertaining to the AB module at FRC Northwest.  We 
proposed a scenario that analyzed limited repair capability at FRC Northwest to include 
upgrading the engine test cell to run the F414 engine.  We sought to determine whether 
providing limited repair capability would positively or negatively affect the readiness of the 
Growler’s engines at NAS Whidbey Island.  The results from our scenario showed that it was 
neither cost effective nor beneficial to the spare engine pool to provide FRC Northwest with 
such capability.  The number of aircraft at which it could make sense was not considered 
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because only 114 aircraft are to be stationed at NAS Whidbey Island.  While performing the 
project, we came across certain areas, which required further research.  Due to the limited 
scope of our project, we did not analyze these areas, but they are recommended for further 
research.  Some of the key areas are outlined in the following subsections. 
1. Bottleneck at FRC Southeast Located at NAS Jacksonville, FL 
A bottleneck is an important concept, which might have a major impact on possible 
improvements in the repair process of the F414 engine.  To maximize the output of any 
system, the bottleneck must be identified as early as possible so that maximum resources can 
be directed to clear it.  Jacobs, Chase, and Aquilano (2009) illustrated this concept as the 
production resource capacity that limits the capacity of the overall process.  A bottleneck 
controls the capacity of the entire system (Jacobs et al., 2009, pp. 164–165).  
The Growler’s engine repair process consists of the squadrons operating at NAS 
Whidbey Island, the I-level repair facility located at NAS Lemoore, CA, and the D-level 
repair facility (for the modules) located at NAS Jacksonville, FL.  While answering the 
research question, we found the depot located at NAS Jacksonville as the bottleneck in the 
repair process of F414 engine.  The depot takes on average 60 days (plus the transportation 
time) to repair the defective modules sent from NAS Lemoore.  
In order to reduce the TAT of an F414 engine, the module repair process at NAS 
Jacksonville needs improvement.  A thesis/project is recommended to study the current 
module repair process and suggest improvements, which will result in reducing the TAT and 
improving the Ao of both the Super Hornet and Growler engines. 
2. Re-Examination of This Study Following Delivery of the 114th Growler 
When the final Growler is delivered, presently scheduled for FY 2018, we 
recommend that the research question be re-evaluated using future NAE practices.  The 
evolution of naval aviation has produced the FRC/Center of Excellence concepts.  These 
practices can be expected to further evolve into a set of practices designed to meet future 
naval aviation goals.  Results of this study could be refuted or validated with these future 
parameters. 
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D.  SUMMARY 
This project introduced an issue of providing FRC Northwest with limited repair 
capability for the Growler’s engine, including updating the existing engine test cell.  We 
provided vital background information, coupled with a literature review, to better understand 
the issue.  We presented the concepts/techniques used to analyze the issue in Chapter IV, 
followed by a detailed analysis of the research question.  We further summarized and 
discussed the results/findings of the analysis in this chapter, along with recommendations 
based upon our calculations and observations. 
We concluded that FRC West is providing F414-GE-400 engine repair to the fleet as 
per the concept of FRC/Center of Excellence and is meeting the objective.  The Growler 
aircraft and its engines are relatively new, and, therefore, are experiencing higher MTBF as 
compared to the fleet.  As elapsed flight hours increase, the MTBF of the Growler’s engines 
will merge with the MTBF of the fleet’s F414 engines.  Providing FRC Northwest with 
limited repair capability for the F414-GE-400 engine, including updating the existing engine 
test cell, will include not only the acquisition cost but also an annual operating cost.  The 
monetary effect of upgrading FRC Northwest’s engine test cell in terms of the engine 
carrying cost was established to fully explore the NPV of the project.    It was determined 
there will be a relatively small positive effect upon Ao of the Growler’s engine.  The 
Growler’s engine will be able to maintain a higher Aₒ for a longer duration in the present 
repair process due to its higher MTBF and the continuous induction of new aircraft and 
engines until FY 2018.  Considering all of these factors and the concept of FRCs, we do not 
recommend providing limited repair capability or updating the existing engine test cell at 
FRC Northwest.  In the end, we have suggested some key areas for further research which 
will affect the Ao of both the Growlers and the aging Super Hornets.  
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